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Abstract
In this paper I examine the phenomenon of informal proofs as found in
mathematical practice and the difficulties these face concerning rigour
and correctness. I focus on one particular type of response, which I call
derivationist, which seeks to explain these in terms of underlying formal
derivations. I proceed to set out five desiderata that the derivationist
approach should aim to satisfy. With particular emphasis on Azzouni’s
derivation-indicator account, I raise a dilemma for the type of link that
must be posited from informal proofs to formal derivations: that it must
either be agent-independent or else agent-dependent. I show that deriva-
tionist theories want to take the first horn, but that considerations of
proof identity, uniqueness and informal content determining formal struc-
ture are serious obstacles in that direction. I further argue that the other
horn is incompatible with the original motivations of the derivationists.
Thus I conclude that the desiderata for a derivationist theory cannot be
satisfied.
1 Introduction
We can distinguish two types of proof: informal proofs and formal proofs (or
proofs and derivations). On the one hand, formal proofs are given an explicit
definition in a formal language: proofs in which all steps are either axioms or
are obtained from the axioms by the applications of fully-stated inference rules.
On the other hand, informal proofs are proofs as they are written and produced
in mathematical practice. They may make assumptions about the intended
audience’s background knowledge and ability to follow lines of reasoning, skip
over tedious or routine steps and make reference to semantic properties and
properties of mathematical objects1 without stating these fully. They also are
not confined to formal languages: though mathematical symbolism may be used,
natural language, diagrams and mixed-mode explanations are freely employed
too.
While formal proofs, in our sense, may be defined mathematically in any
1As seen through the ‘Plato-tinted spectacles’ described in (Buldt, Löwe & Müller, 2008).
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number of ways2, informal proofs are much harder to pin down precisely. We
may give a general description of what they are like (as I began above), or as
others have similarly done: “...what we do to make each other believe our the-
orems...[an] argument which convinces the qualified, skeptical expert.” (Hersh,
1997, p. 153); “...a kind of meaningful narrative... more like a story, or even
a drama, conveyed to us in language calling on our semantic and intuitive un-
derstanding.” (Robinson, 1991, p. 269); “...a conceptual proof of customary
mathematical discourse, having an irreducible semantic content...” (Rav, 1999,
p. 11) or “a sequence of thoughts convincing a sound mind” (Gödel, 1953, p.
341). However, the real problem is not giving such a general description of what
informal proofs are like, but it is rather to sort those informal proofs which are
correct and rigorous from those which are not.
While we may associate deductive reasoning and logicality with formal proofs
in formal systems, actual mathematics is regularly presented informally using
informal proofs.3 This challenges any proponent of an account of philosophy of
mathematics to also give an account of how proving, as it is practiced, relates
to the idealised notion of formal proofs. There are many directions to take for
such an account, from Lakatosian dialectics (see Lakatos, 1976) all the way to
denying that any mathematics took place before Frege. In this paper I want
to focus on just one family of responses, wherein the rigour and correctness of
informal proofs is taken to be dependent (in some sense) on associated formal
proofs. Call this family of views the derivationist approach.4 There are a
number of different connections that informal proofs can be argued to have to
their formal counterparts: reductions, logical forms, explications, abbreviations,
sketches, formalisations, etc. In this paper I will look at one particular proposal
by Azzouni: that informal proofs indicate underlying formal proofs.5
I will begin by laying out some desiderata that any successful derivationist
account of informal proofs must meet. I will then explain Azzouni’s account
of informal proofs, focusing on the particular connection between formal and
informal proofs that is posited and how well Azzouni’s account would meet the
given desiderata. In section 4 I present a dilemma, asking whether the link
from informal proofs to underlying formal derivation is an agent-independent
one or whether it is dependent on the agent who is presenting the proof. I take
Azzouni to need the former in order to be successful in obtaining his brand of
derivationism, but but in section 5 I will criticise this horn of the dilemma based
2Avoiding, for the purposes of this paper, the need to fully get to grips with what it means
to be formal. For work towards this see (MacFarlane, 2000; Dutilh Novaes, 2011).
3What is ‘actual mathematics’? The intended answer here is mathematics as it is practiced
but this is only enlightening in that it points to further questions that need to be addressed,
concerning which parts of mathematical practice are relevant. For the purposes of this paper
I take actual mathematics to simply be that published in mathematics journals, presented at
conferences and taught in mathematics classes. A number of interesting discussions of this
question can be found in (Mancosu, 2008).
4I specifically avoid calling this formalism because the derivationist stance is broader
and may encompass positions that would traditionally fall outside of the formalist school
of thought.
5The bulk of this position is given in (Azzouni, 2004a) and (Azzouni, 2005a).
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on a problem of overgeneration. Azzouni can avoid this problem if he adopts
the second horn of the dilemma, but in section 6 I will argue that this is not
compatible with Azzouni’s theory. I shall therefore argue that the account is
deficient in dealing with the various desiderata it is aiming to address. Finally,
I will conclude that the fundamental diffculty that prevents Azzouni’s account
from being successful is one that is a general roadblock to successfully providing
a derivationist account of informal proofs.
2 Minimal Desiderata of a Derivationist Account
of Informal Proofs
In this section I shall lay down the minimal aims that a derivationist account
should achieve in dealing with the problem of informal proofs. By making the
these intentions clear from the outset, we will be able to see where conflicts
arise.
We can begin with two desiderata that were already mentioned:
(Rigour) To give an account of how informal proofs are (or can be
said to be) rigorous through their connection to formal proofs.
(Correctness) To distinguish correct informal proofs from incor-
rect ones i.e. the connection should only link the informal proofs
that are correct to the justifying formal proofs.
The first of these is precisely the challenge the derivationist faces in arguing
that informal proofs can be rigorous if they are connected to formal proofs in
the right kind of way. The second adds to this the need to properly distinguish
the correct informal proofs from incorrect ones. One could interpret this as
the intention not to over-generate through the posited connection: it would
be undesirable for the link matching informal proofs to formal proofs to also
associate flawed informal proofs with justifying formal proofs.
Since informal proofs arise from mathematical practice and the way in which
we engage with and do mathematics, another desideratum is the following:
(Agreement) To explain how, in practice, mathematicians manage
to consistently converge and agree on the correctness of informal
proofs. (Additionally, to give an account of informal proofs that
were conceived of long before we had a sufficiently strong account of
formal proofs to support them.)
The main part of (Agreement) is to actually engage with informal proofs as a
social phenomenon; to explain how and why the mathematical community has
employed informal proofs, as well as how the underlying link the derivationist
account argues for relates to this practice. The addendum presses the require-
ment further, asking for the account to also explain how the cumulative nature
of mathematics fits with the fact that formal proofs are a rather recent discovery
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(in the strong sense that a derivationist account needs). A requirement like this
is to avoid the immediate objection that might be raised: that formal proofs
cannot underwrite informal ones, because historically we have been using the
latter far longer.
Now I will impose a stronger demand on the derivationists, the demand that
their account doesn’t simply state what the link is between formal and informal
proof (abbreviating, indicating, logical form etc.) but that instead it gives some
substance to the link.
(Content) To show how the content of an informal proof determines
the structure of the formal proof(s) it maps to.
A reason that informal proofs do present a substantial difficulty is that, in many
ways, they are and appear quite different to any formal proofs. In answering
such a difficulty, then, saying that the relation between them is of a certain kind
is the easy part; showing that it is so is much harder. What the account needs
to provide is an explanation of how exactly the informal proof can be used to
pick out some formal proof or proofs. The picking out must surely (and at least
partially) follow the content of the informal proof, so the account needs to tell
us about how this content determines the structure of the formal proof that is
associated with it.
We may elaborate the above further, to require a response to the particular
tricky cases:
(Techniques) To provide an explanation of apparently inherently
informal techniques.
A main example of what is required here is dealing with diagrams in mathemat-
ics. A legitimate response is to argue for some kind of eliminability thesis for
diagrams: that all diagrams must be eliminable from proofs entirely. Of course,
such an argument would need to be given to complete the account, and may
bring additional commitments. Other examples are proofs using symmetry, or
the ‘untraversed gaps’ described in (Fallis, 2003).
3 Azzouni’s Derivation-Indicator View
Azzouni’s derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice, as presented in
(Azzouni, 2004a, 2005a), takes the link between informal and formal proofs to
be that informal proofs indicate underlying formal proofs.6 In his own words:
I take a proof to indicate an ‘underlying’ derivation... Since (a)
derivations are (in principle) mechanically checkable, and since (b)
the algorithmic systems that codify which rules may be applied to
6Although it should be noted that Azzouni has largely dropped the ‘indicating’ terminology
in later developments of the view in (Azzouni, 2005b) and (Azzouni, 2009) for reasons we will
see in section 4.
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produce derivations in a given system are (implicitly or, often nowa-
days, explicitly) recognized by mathematicians, it follows that if
proofs really are devices mathematicians use to convince one another
of one or another mechanically-checkable derivation, this suffices to
explain why mathematicians are so good at agreeing with one an-
other on whether some proof convincingly establishes a theorem.
(Azzouni, 2004a, p. 84)
The focus here is very much on answering (Agreement), dealing with the
general social conformity regarding good and bad proofs. However, it is clear
that for Azzouni this is closely linked to (Rigour) and (Correctness) in that
the link will explain the agreement in terms of informal proofs being correct or
rigorous due to underlying formal proofs.
An interesting aspect of Azzouni’s view is that the formal proofs are defined
more liberally than usual. He takes them to be located within ‘algorithmic
systems’, which are not restricted in the ways we generally take formal proofs
to be:
I’ve already stressed that ‘algorithmic systems’ are restricted neither
to a particular logic, a particular subject-matter, nor even to an ex-
plicit language (as opposed to something diagrammatic or pictorial).
What is required is that ‘proofs’, however these be understood, are
(in principle) mechanically recognizable. (Azzouni, 2004a, p. 86)
This has already been criticised (see Rav, 2007), with a response from Azzouni
in (Azzouni, 2009), so I shall not take up this discussion here. However, in the
present context the motivation for this view should garner at least some sym-
pathy, for Azzouni is explicitly trying to leave open a straightforward route to
meeting the demands of (Techniques), in particular those regarding diagrams
as used in mathematics. This focus on diagramatic reasoning becomes clearer
if we note Azzouni’s reference to another of his papers analysing diagrammatic
reasoning in Euclid’s Elements (Azzouni, 2004b), suggesting that he believes di-
agrammatic proofs do not always need to be informal, so long as they are given
a mechanically checkable structure.7 More on Azzouni’s views of diagrams in
mathematics can also be found in (Azzouni, 2013).
Turning now to the question of how exactly it is that derivation-indication
links informal proofs to formal ones (and thereby the question of (Content)),
Azzouni does not argue that each informal proof is underwritten by some unique
formal proof in one algorithmic system. That would, he claims, be implausible
as an account of mathematical practice because in reality mathematicians are
not held to one specific inference system. Furthermore, if an account did limit
mathematicians to one specific formal system it would be open to objections
based on incompleteness phenomena. Instead, in Azzouni’s view each informal
proof relates to a family of formal proofs which are located in a number of
different algorithmic systems.
7Understanding formal proofs as mechanically checkable ones takes one of the stances on
the debate over what it means to be formal found in (Dutilh Novaes, 2011).
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It doesn’t much matter where in the family of algorithmic systems
we take ‘the’ derivation indicated by a proof to be located... since
algorithmic systems embedded in one another are so embedded to
conserve derivational results, we can take the derivation indicated
to be one located in any algorithmic system within which the result
occurs and is surveyable. (Azzouni, 2004a, pp. 93–94)
The conservativity requirement holding between algorithmic systems in which
‘the same’ formal proof is located comes closely coupled with a translation of
the ideas up and down systems:
Indeed, provided one is very strict about concept-individuation con-
ditions, what can be claimed is that the new systems come with
all-new concepts—and the old ones have simply been stipulatively
identified with (some of these) new concepts. Such a stipulative
identification of concepts that proves valuable is innocuous solely
because of the cumulative way that algorithmic systems are embed-
ded in one another: none of the old results regarding the old set of
concepts are jettisoned—new material has only been added. (Az-
zouni, 2004a, p. 98)
Azzouni rightly observes the need to deal with (Techniques) and, specifi-
cally, that many informal techniques do not seem to point directly to something
formal. The particular example Azzouni gives is using symmetry, i.e. doing one
part of a proof and then observing that another part is proved symmetrically.
What is understood is that the part of the proof already given could be easily
edited and adjusted to give the other part, though the exact details of such an
adjustment are never given. The solution he offers is that in the course of infor-
mal proofs mathematicians may be using ‘meta-level’ reasoning, which means
that the system(s) that the indicated derivation is located in will be ‘larger’:
When formalized as a derivation, such a proof will necessarily con-
tain metamathematical elements which naturally drive it into the
form of a derivation in a system strictly larger than one about, say,
the objects officially under study. Mathematicians automatically
ascend to a discussion of what can be taken to be properties and re-
lations of the relations and properties of the objects they are proving
results about. (Azzouni, 2004a, p. 94)
Here, his discussion of how to deal with the case of symmetry additionally reveals
some of the main evidence of what his view on (Content) is. It appears that
aside from these tricky cases of meta-level reasoning and the like, the actual link
from informal proofs to formal ones will usually be a straightforward ‘filling in
the gaps’-type process. However, in developing the view further in later work,
Azzouni explicitly moves away from this ‘filling in the gaps’ account to a more
sophisticated picture separating the way we come to understand informal proofs
(through ‘inference packages’) from the way that corresponding formal proofs
are determined (see Azzouni, 2005b, p. 40). Regardless, the worries I raise
hereafter apply equally to both.
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4 A Dilemma
It is now time to start exploring the relation of derivation-indication more thor-
oughly. A particularly weak understanding would be to see informal proofs as a
kind of time-saving communicative device, allowing mathematicians to quickly
transfer formal proofs by indicating them to one another using informal proofs.
However, this is not Azzouni’s intended meaning; he, in fact, explicitly rules out
the idea that mathematicians need to be aware of the underlying derivations (“I
should add that it isn’t a requirement on ‘indicating’ that mathematicians, gen-
erally, be aware that their proofs indicate derivations.” (Azzouni, 2005a, fn.
16) or similarly (Azzouni, 2009, fn. 17)). So if not this, what is meant by in-
dicating? Since the general intention is to give an account of (Agreement),
(Correctness) and (Rigour), it appears that what is required is that indica-
tion is some kind of dependence relation, but what properties it should have is
just one of many questions that must be faced to complete the account.
The particular question I propose to press for this account is the following: is
derivation-indication agent-dependent or agent-independent?8 Since, in essence,
it is a proof that indicates a derivation it is relevant to ask who the supposed
agent in this dilemma is. The proposal is that, on the one hand, the dependence
link could be argued to not involve any kind of agent (say mathematician,
student, listener, reader or anyone else that is involved in the particular instance
of the proof). On the other hand, the agent-dependent horn of the dilemma
suggests that the link from informal to formal proof may not be fully present in
the proof itself, but instead something over and above generated by the practice
of proving i.e. something that is added by some involved agent.
In what follows I will examine the two horns of this dilemma, arguing that
Azzouni is proposing an agent-independent link between formal and informal
proof. However, I will contend that taking this horn will not be successful, based
on a problem of the informal proofs corresponding to multiple, non-equivalent
formal proofs. Taking the link to be agent-dependent, I argue, is not an escape
option for the derivationist though, because doing so fails to satisfy the original
motivations of the derivationist enterprise.
5 Agent-Independent Derivation-Indicators
In this section I will consider the agent-independent horn of the dilemma, in-
vestigating the correspondence it posits between informal and formal proofs in
order to show the ways in which this correspondence cannot support the answers
to the various desiderata set out above.
Let us consider the following question: does each informal proof relate to
just one unique formal proof or to many of them? We have already seen that for
Azzouni each informal proof relates to a whole family of derivations, due to the
8This question is very close to the question of whether formalisation is a process that varies
with the agent performing it, like Carnap’s notion of explication (Carnap, 1945) or whether
it instead is a process of revealing the ‘deep structure’ of the target phenomenon.
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fact that he believes that ‘the’ formal proof is located in a range of algorithmic
systems and, strictly speaking, these are different proofs.9 The question can
be reissued in these terms, though: for some given informal proof, is there a
unique formal proof relative to each algorithmic system it appears in? In all
cases where Azzouni touches on the issue, he seems to want each informal proof
to pick out one unique formal proof per algorithmic system, within the upper
and lower bounds.10
Let us think about this kind of uniqueness, since proof identity conditions
are central to the problem I raise this section.
We already saw in section 3 that on the derivationist picture the informal
proofs depend on formal proofs to be able to answer the various desiderata laid
out above. In the light of this, the identity of proofs is highly relevant because
it affects which formal proof(s) an informal proof depends on, and consequently
impacts how well the desiderata are met. For example, if an informal proof
does not depend on a unique formal proof (per algorithmic system) but instead
depends on multiple, non-identical or non-equivalent formal proofs, then this
could lead to further difficulties, say, in satisfying (Rigour) and (Correct-
ness). For it is the underlying formal proofs that are meant to be ensuring
the rigour and correctness of informal proofs, but if there are multiple different
formal proofs simultaneously being depended upon this undermines the effec-
tiveness of the explanation the derivation-indicator account gives. For example,
what is there then to stop an informal proof from corresponding to both one
correct and one incorrect formal proof? The point is that if it is the case that
the informal proof does not uniquely determine which formal proof it depends
on, then the dependence is far weaker than is required to actually satisfy the
desiderata. Once it is conceded that there are multiple different, non-equivalent
formal proofs underlying some informal proof, we can immediately ask why it is
these particular ones that are selected and what ensures that it is only correct
and rigorous formal proofs that are picked out. Now, if we need an extra step to
clarify why the informal proof only corresponds to just to those formal proofs
which do ensure rigour and correctness, then it is this additional step that is
doing all of the philosophical work and the account given has failed to properly
answer the questions posed.
If the underlying formal proof is unique in some sense, then it seems the
structure of the formal proof could, perhaps, be related to the content of the
informal proof and avoid this underdetermination. Such considerations are also
clearly present in Azzouni’s theory: the fact that he writes of the underlying
formal proof in the singular11, even when it is in fact located in different algo-
rithmic systems with different languages, does not appear to be accidental. Of
course, we did see that this required two extra components. Firstly, the moves
9This is because a formal proof is relative to a formal system and language.
10It should be noted that Azzouni, despite attempting to deal with some of the key issues
of mathematical practice and informal proof, is never particularly explicit about the answers
to these questions. Dealing with the various options for what he can and may want to mean
is precisely the current undertaking.
11As evidenced by the quotations in section 3.
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‘upwards’ had to be conservative of the derivational results, to make sure ‘the’
formal proof is still present as one extends the system. Secondly, we need to be
able to identify proofs up and down systems to ensure they are still the same in
this crucial sense. As we saw above, this is achieved by stipulatively identifying
concepts between formal systems. I shall return to these moves once the worry
has been further articulated.
In the remainder of this section I will show that the lack of a unique determi-
nation of the formal proofs an informal proof depends on does indeed occur and
that as a result the problem just described applies to the derivation-indicator
view on the agent-independent horn of the dilemma.12 Another way of describ-
ing this problem is as an overgeneration problem. The idea is not that informal
proofs are too resistant to formalisation but instead that they are not resistant
enough. There are multiple, equally legitimate formal proofs corresponding to
any given informal proof and it is this multitude which throws doubt on there
being any deep philosophical significance to the correspondence at all.
When proposing this overgeneration worry for derivationist views, something
that is often brought up in response is whether or not the difference between
the various proofs is substantial. The thought is, presumably, that if the type
of difference between the various formal proofs is only minor or insubstantial,
then the proofs may be essentially the same and so the overgeneration problem
loses its bite. However, I do not find this distinction particularly helpful in
avoiding the problem for two reasons. Firstly, while being essentially the same
may hold for two formal proofs with only some minor change, making lots of
minor changes could add up to a substantial change quite easily. Secondly, I
don’t expect there is any robust way of separating the variations between formal
proofs into substantial and insubstantial ones, but rather that the variations will
come in degrees from very minor all the way to being totally different proofs.
Nonetheless, I will accept the distinction for the sake of argument and proceed
to why I think there will be both the smaller and the more substantial variations
between the formal proofs that some given informal proof will depend on.
Given some informal proof, it is straightforward to see that there must be
a selection of formal proofs that it corresponds to just from the minor and in-
substantial variations that can be introduced. Examples I have in mind are
variable-renaming; changing the order of independent lemmas; switching be-
tween inter-definable logical constants; changing between the order you prove
bi-conditionals (i.e. starting right-to-left or left-to-right) etc. Of course, the
kind of changes that are minor will depend on the particular proof, since at
times these rather innocuous differences can be relevant (or even crucial) to the
success of the proof. This not only supports my claim that the distinction be-
tween minor and substantial differences is not a robust one, but also the more
general argument I am making that even the minor differences can potentially
cause problems for the agent-independent take on derivationism.
Now Azzouni has essentially two options. He can stick to his guns, as it
12I believe the other horn does not suffer this same problem, as will be discussed in section
6.
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were, and insist that for any given informal proof there is just one formal proof
per algorithmic system, in which case he fails to capture basic intuitions about
formal proof identity concerning these minor variations, say, as well as being
exposed to a worry about the arbitrariness of the particular proof that underlies
the informal proof. Alternatively, he can accept that there is instead some
equivalence class of formal proofs in each system matching up to any informal
proof. In this case, for some given informal proof and an appropriate algorithmic
system, there is a class of formal proofs that the informal proof indicates. It
seems obvious that Azzouni should take the latter option; given that he accepts
inter-system identity of proof, intra-system identity does not appear to be any
more problematic.
However innocuous intra-system identity may seem, it is in fact deeply prob-
lematic, even in cases of insubstantial variation. To begin, a concern is that even
though we have seen some suggestions for the acceptable minor variations listed
above, if the minor variations do still keep the given formal proof ‘essentially
the same’, then we would certainly like a more complete description of the kind
of variations that are acceptable. With this comes the further need to justify
such choices and convince us that adding up the differences will not eventually
amount to a more substantial change. Considering the huge variety of systems
that we could be talking about here, these demands will not realistically be
met. The rhetorical point, though, is that the granularity of the notion of proof
identity in play will have a bearing on how well the theory holds up under
scrutiny.
Even if there are answers to the questions of the previous paragraph, this
does not settle the matter concerning proof identity. Azzouni’s theory, for good
reason, identifies proofs between different algorithmic systems via the stipula-
tive identification between concepts and conservative translations between the
systems. Again, if we were dealing with just a single formal proof in each al-
gorithmic system then this process might work, but if there is an equivalence
class of formal proofs underlying some informal proof in each algorithmic sys-
tem, then once again there are technical issues that must be addressed. Even
when the variations are minor relative to some particular algorithmic system,
those differences could be exacerbated and enlarged by the translation between
systems. Formal proofs that were essentially the same (in the sense of being in
the same equivalence class) in one system could, for all we know, be translated
to proofs that are no longer the same according to the equivalence conditions
in that other algorithmic system. Suppose we have two formal proofs P and Q
in algorithmic system A that are both in the equivalence class underlying some
informal proof, then translate them in Azzouni’s sense to some other algorith-
mic system B. There is no guarantee that the translations t(P ) and t(Q) will
be in the equivalence class for the informal proof in system B.
There are two ways that one might try to avoid this concern of identity and
translation: by appeal to conservativity and stipulative identity. Conservativity
ensures that no results are jettisoned when moving between algorithmic systems,
so we are safe in the knowledge that whatever we have a proof for in the weaker
system will also have a proof in the stronger one. Yet this is certainly not
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enough to avoid the problem, since the way it is posed does not require the
result to disappear, rather that the translation may take minor differences and
make them substantial in the translation process. This can certainly happen
if the result is still present in the new system. The fact that the identification
between systems is stipulative can also not do any work here, because as we
saw above the stipulative identity is only argued to be innocuous thanks to the
conservativity. Now I argue that when it comes to formal proof identity, the
stipulation of identity might not be innocuous (in that substantial differences
might creep into proofs during translation) and that conservativity does not
allow a way out of this fact, therefore making use of stipulative identity would
beg the question.
So much for minor variations; what of more substantial ones? Are there ways
in which the underlying formal proofs can differ which amount to significant
and sizeable differences? I believe that there certainly are and will now give an
example where this can be seen. First, though, I want to give some thought
as to what ‘substantial’ differences could be like. There is a sense in which the
type of differences is constrained by the informal proof that the formal proofs
all correspond to, yet this constraint does not, I argue, prevent substantial
differences from appearing. The two most straightforward places to see this are
in the treatment of mathematical objects and the mathematical dependencies a
theorem has. Firstly, the treatment of the objects of an informal proof have to
give some formal reconstruction of the objects in terms of relevant properties (at
least those that are used in the proof). How the objects are represented in the
formal system, then, will affect how the formal details of the proof go. Even for
these details there may be multiple different ways to do things (totally ignored in
the informal proof). Together we get different formal constructions (which will
only have to overlap in some crucial properties) with different technical details.
Of course, differences in the representation will have knock-on and snowballing
effects the further through the proof we go, as the different representations and
details of the formal proofs cascade along. After all, the exacting nature of
formal proofs brings with it a delicate balance that must be maintained for
the proof to be correct. Secondly, by representing the proof in different places,
the mathematical dependencies that the proof has will be altered to support
the type of specific inferences that may be made in that system. From all of
these factors, the appearance of variations between the formal proofs that are
substantial should be expected.
Let us flesh this out with a concrete example. The one I have in mind is
that of the mutilated chessboard.13 The statement and proof are the following:
An ordinary chess board has had two squares—one at each end of a
diagonal—removed. There is on hand a supply of 31 dominos, each
of which is large enough to cover exactly two adjacent squares of
the board. Is it possible to lay the dominos on the mutilated chess
13This example is central in (Robinson, 1991) and can also be found in (Black, 1946) and
(Gardner, 1957).
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board in such a manner as to cover it completely? (Black, 1946, p.
157)
It is impossible ... and the proof is easy. The two diagonally opposite
corners are the same color. Therefore their removal leaves a board
with two more squares of one color than of the other. Each domino
covers two squares of opposite color, since only opposite colors are
adjacent. After you have covered 60 squares with 30 dominos, you
are left with two uncovered squares of the same color. These two
cannot be adjacent, therefore they cannot be covered by the last
domino. (Gardner, 1957)
This example has intentionally been chosen as one which is intuitively cor-
rect, rigorous and understandable but also has a great deal of freedom regarding
the underlying formal derivations that Azzouni’s theory is committed to.
One common response that the deriviationists usually have open to them is,
interestingly, not available in this case. The response would be that Azzouni
could give up the need for translations between systems and
As a final point against the agent-independence of underlying formal proofs,
I add that the problems of the identity and uniqueness of formal proofs strike
me as the easier ones to answer compared to questions about the identity of
informal proofs. There are very strong intuitions concerning which informal
proofs are the same and which are not (an issue that is, for example, important
to properly crediting mathematicians for their new discoveries). Presumably,
in trying to examine mathematical practice, at least some attention should be
paid to ideas of informal identity. An even broader line of difficulties would
emerge from this though, concerning whether informal proofs which are infor-
mally identical should indicate the same classes of formal proofs and if not, why
not.
All of the above follows Azzouni along the agent-independent horn of the
dilemma. Taking the other horn would make matters like this far easier to deal
with, since which class of formal proofs (both inter- and intra-system) underlies
the informal proof would depend on the particular agent and circumstances of
the informal proof. Unfortunately, the second horn cannot be what Azzouni
wants because it does not suffice to establish the derivationist claims, as I will
argue in the next section.
6 Agent-Dependent Derivation-Indicators
So let us consider the other horn of the dilemma, which has it that the formal
proof(s) underlying any given informal one are agent-dependent and supplied
over and above what is already present in the proof itself. This horn would
yield great benefits: there would be readily available practical evidence that
proofs can be linked to formal derivations from the field of Formal Mathemat-
ics, in which there is an ever-growing collection of computer-checkable formal
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counterparts for well-known mathematical proofs.14 At least on the surface,
the success of this grand formalisation project should add great credence to the
idea that informal proofs can be linked to derivations. However, we once again
encounter the chasm that the dilemma opens up. Formal Mathematics is very
clearly agent-dependent, with different mathematicians converting different in-
formal proofs to equally different derivations. In this section I will make the
case that the agent-dependent horn of the dilemma is not available to Azzouni
or other derivationists.
Firstly, as we have seen, Azzouni insists that the agents need not be aware
of the indicated derivation that underlies the informal proof they are communi-
cating. This in itself seems to put a stop to agent-dependence for Azzouni, for
if the formal proof depends on agents who have no access to the formal proof
there is little hope of success in this direction. Furthermore, one of the main
desiderata for Azzouni, that of (Agreement), would be left in a far more pre-
carious position. For the social agreement on what constitues a correct proof
is explained in terms of the indicated derivations, but if the link is now agent-
dependent then there is no given reason why any two people will have the same
class of derivations underlying the informal proof. In this case, mathematics
could then end up as a lot of talking past one another.
The original reasons for wanting to reject the notion that mathematicians
are aware of the underlying formal derivations are good ones. Firstly, this sim-
ply does not match up to the reality of mathematical practice. Secondly, this
would fail to answer the clause of (Agreement) which asks for an explana-
tion of mathematics done long before there were formal proofs in mathematics.
Finally, formal proofs for mathematics tend to be long and unwieldy therefore
not the kind of thing that are ‘easy’ to know. In (Pelc, 2009), it is argued that
the formal counterparts to informal proof of theorems that have already been
proved may very well not just be currently inaccessible to us, but beyond the
physical limits of our universe to ever potentially check.15 By avoiding hav-
ing the mathematicians aware of the underlying derivations, Azzouni will be
sidestepping these three concerns. Except, if Azzouni were to now take the sec-
ond horn of the dilemma then these worries would be back with a vengeance.
For in that case he would need to explain how the link from informal to formal
proofs can be agent-dependent while the agent may nonetheless have no access
to the formal proof, which is precisely the type of worry he was attempting to
sidestep.
Generalising somewhat to other derivationist arguments, there is an even
more crucial reason that they should not want to accept that their link is agent-
dependent. This is that whatever the posited link may be from informal proofs
to their formal counterparts, this link is one of dependence. The entire project
is aimed at explaining the utility of informal proofs in terms of formal proofs,
with their philosophically more straightforward use of logic and deductive rea-
soning. The desiderata of (Correctness) and (Rigour) can be tackled by
14In mechanical proof-checkers such as Coq, Mizar, Isabelle, etc.
15See also (Boolos, 1987) for another unwieldy formal proof for a clear informal one.
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taking advantage of the dependence of informal proofs on formal ones to import
the story of rigour or correctness we have for the latter. However, if we make
this link agent-dependent, then the clear waters are muddied once again by
the complicated relationship that the posited link has with the mathematicians
themselves. For the entire point of the undertaking is to resolve the tricky prob-
lem of the practical, real-life side of mathematics in the philosophically simpler
terms of formal derivations. If the posited link is agent-dependent, the very
difficulty that we were resolving simply re-emerges at another level. In short,
the attempt to answer the problem of informal proofs in mathematical practice
will find itself once again dealing with the practical difficulties of formalisation.
This should be unacceptable to any derivationist account.
7 Conclusion
Having seen that the agent-dependent approach is not compatible with the
derivationist aims, let me now return to the first horn of the dilemma and give
a reason as to why an independent link from informal proofs to underlying
formal ones is going to be particularly hard to establish.
The reason is embodied in the desideratum of (Content). To successfully
give the type of account that the derivationist is after, one has to go from the
informal, implicit, gappy and oftentimes hidden structure of the informal proof
to a fully explicit formal proof, which has picked out everything down to the
smallest details. But one of the obvious reasons that formal proofs are rarely
employed in practice is that these minutiae will get in the way of explanation,
comprehension and communication of proofs. The result is, unsurprisingly, that
they are often left out. What follows, then, is that the link is adding extra
structure and detail in going from informal to formal proofs.
Positing an agent-independent link, the details that have to be filled in should
be routine and fully determined. The thought behind this could be, for example,
that getting from the informal to the formal just involves taking all the gaps in
the informal proof and applying a mechanical process of filling in these gaps.
However, while this might work in a few cases, say where the target proof
is already close to being fully formal, it is certainly not a general procedure.
Mainly this is because even rather small gaps can have multiple different ways
of being filled out.
Although such multiple realisations of the formal proofs corresponding to
informal ones don’t pose such a problem to a weaker, agent-dependent notion
of formalisation, if we want an independent link this is a serious problem be-
cause it compels us to go beyond the link to explaining which realisation is the
correct one or how they can all be correct, and as we have seen neither option
is particularly easy. The difficulty of filling in these gaps is further compounded
by the fact that proofs have a great deal of structure, which means that how
we fill in a gap at one point can and does affect the options for different gaps.
Believing that the answers to these technicalities is somehow already present in
the proof and objectively determined is entirely misguided.
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The moral, then, is that satisfying (Content) is really quite a challenging
problem. Interestingly, the problem is one that extends far beyond Azzouni’s
particular proposal to derivationist projects generally. Whether one wants to
reduce all mathematics to formal derivations, claim that informal proofs reveal a
complete logical form, or any other proposal in this direction, the hard problem
of (Content) is a serious roadblock.
A weaker but maybe more acceptable proposal might be something like
the following: that informal proofs should be theoretically formalisable, in the
sense that the mathematician producing them should be confident that all of
the moves involved in the proof are logical, deductive inferences which in theory
could be made explicit in some way. Such an agent-dependent view does want
to associate logicality and formality with explicit deductive steps, but doesn’t
rely on some dependence of the full informal proof on some particular class of
formal ones. Of course, there are still many issues with such a proposal, which
will have to be discussed elsewhere.
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